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Abstract
We investigate bi-valued auctions in the digital good setting and construct an explicit poly-
nomial time deterministic auction. We prove an unconditional tight lower bound which holds
even for random superpolynomial auctions. The analysis of the construction uses the adoption of
the finer lens of general competitiveness which considers additive losses on top of multiplicative
ones. The result implies that general competitiveness is the right notion to use in this setting,
as this optimal auction is uncompetitive with respect to competitive measures which do not
consider additive losses.
1 introduction
Marketing a digital good may suffer from a low revenue due to incomplete knowledge of the mar-
keter. Consider, for example, a major sport event with some 108 potential TV viewers. Assume
further that every potential viewer is willing to pay $10 or more to watch the event, and that no
more than 106 are willing to pay $100 for that. If the concessionaire will charge $1 or $100 as a
fixed pay per view price for the event, the overall collected revenue will be $108 at the most. This
is worse than the revenue that can be collected, having known the valuations beforehand.
This lack of knowledge motivates the study of unlimited supply, unit demand, single item auc-
tions. Goldberg et al. [11] studied these auctions; in order to obtain a prior free, worst case analysis
framework, they suggested to compare the revenue of these auctions to the revenue of optimal fixed
price auctions. They adopted the online algorithms terminology [20] and named the revenue of
the fixed price auction the offline revenue and the revenue of a multi price truthful auction, i.e.,
an auction for which every bidder has an incentive to bid its own value, online revenue. The com-
petitive ratio of an auction for a bid vector b is defined to be the ratio between the best offline
revenue for b to the revenue of that auction on b. The competitive ratio of an auction is just the
worst competitive ratio of that auction on all possible bid vectors. For random auctions, a similar
notion is defined by taking the expected revenue. If an auction has a constant competitive ratio it
is said to be competitive. If an auction has a constant competitive ratio, possibly with some small
additive loss, it is said to be general competitive (see Section 2 for definitions). We remark that
later, Koutsoupias and Pierrakos [13] used online auctions in the usual context of online algorithms,
but here we will stick to Goldberg et al.’s [11] notion.
∗Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Haifa, Israel. Email: orenb@technion.ac.il.
This research was supported in part by the Google Inter-university center for Electronic Markets and Auctions.
†Department of Computer Science, Haifa University, Haifa, Israel. Email: ilan@cs.haifa.ac.il.
1
This attempt to carefully select the right benchmark in order to obtain a prior free, worst case
analysis was a posteriori justified when Hartline and Roughgarden defined a general benchmark for
the analysis of single parameter mechanism design problems [12]. This general benchmark, which
bridges Bayesian analysis [16] from economics and worst case analysis from the theory of computer
science, collides for our setting with the optimal fixed price benchmark [12].
A further justification for taking the offline fixed price auction as a benchmark is the following.
Although an online auction seems less restricted than the offline fixed price auction, as it can assign
different players different prices, it was shown [9] that the online truthful revenue is no more than
the offline revenue. In fact, there even exists a lower bound of 2.42 on the competitive ratio of any
truthful online auction [10]. Note, however, that the optimal offline revenue (or more precisely the
optimal fixed price) is unknown to the concessionaire in advance.
It is well known (see for example [15]) that in order to achieve truthfulness one can use only the
set of bid independent auctions, i.e., auctions in which the price offered to a bidder is independent
of the bidder’s own bid value. Hence, an intuitive auction that often comes to one’s mind is the
Deterministic Optimal Price (DOP) auction [2, 9, 19]. In this auction the mechanism computes
and offers each bidder the price of an optimal offline auction for all other bids. This auction
preforms well on most bid vectors. In fact, it was even proved by Segal [19] that if the input is
chosen uniformly at random, then this auction is asymptotically optimal. For a worst case analysis,
however, it preforms very poor. Consider, for example, an auction in which there are n bidders
and only two possible bid values: 1 and h, where h ≫ 1. We denote this setting as bi-valued
auctions. Let nh be the number of bidders who bid h. Applying DOP on a bid vector for which
nh = n/h will result in a revenue of nh instead of the n revenue of an offline auction. This is because
every “h-bidder” is offered 1 (since n − 1 > h · (nh − 1)) and every “1-bidder” is offered h (since
n−1 < h ·nh). Here an “h-bidder” refers to a bidder that bids h and a “1-bidder” refers to a bidder
that bids 1. Therefore, the competitive ratio of DOP is unbounded. Similar examples regarding
the performances of DOP in the bi-valued auction setting appeared already in Goldberg et al. [9],
and in Aggarwal et al. [2].
Goldberg et al. [11] showed that there exist random competitive auctions. Other works with
different random competitive auctions, competitive lower bounds, and better analysis of existing
auctions were presented, see for example [7, 8, 10]. For a survey see the work of Hartline and
Karlin that appeared in [17, Chapter 13] (Profit Maximization In Mechanism Design). In all these
works, no deterministic auction was presented. In fact, Goldberg et al. [9, 11] even proved that
randomization is essential assuming the auction is symmetric (aka anonymous), i.e., assuming the
outcome of the auction does not depend on the order of the input bids.
Aggarwal et al. [1,2] later showed how to construct from any randomized auction a deterministic,
asymmetric auction with a factor 4 loss in the gained revenue. This result was then improved by
the authors together with Wolfovitz [3], but no tight derandomization was ever presented.
1.1 Our Results
We introduce a tight deterministic auction for bi-valued auctions, with bid values {1, h} and n bid-
ders. We show a polynomial time deterministic auction, which guaranty a revenue of max {n, h · nh}−
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O(
√
n · h), where nh is just the number of bidders that bid h. We then show that this bound is
unconditionally optimal by showing that every auction (including a random superpolynomial one),
cannot guaranty more than max {n, h · nh} − Ω(
√
n · h). That is, there exists an auction with no
multiplicative loss and with only O(
√
n · h) additive loss, and every auction has at-least these losses.
Let us note here, that if we restrict ourselves to anonymous auctions (symmetric) then we have a
multiplicative loss of Ω(h) and an additive loss of Ω(n/h) over the max {n, h · nh} revenue of the
best offline [2, 9].
The solution for this auction is build upon a new solution for a hat guessing game [4]. The
connection between digital good auctions and hat guessing games was established by the work of
Aggarwal et al. [1]. Here we reinforce these connections and show a connection to a different game
called the majority game which was studied by Doerr [5] and by Feige [6].
1.2 Additive Loss
Already in the work that suggested to use competitive analysis, namely Goldberg et al. [11], a
major obstacle arises. It was indicated that no auction can be competitive against bids with one
high value (see Goldberg et al. [9] for details). The first solution that was suggested to this
problem was taking a different benchmark as the offline auction. This different benchmark was
again the maximum single price auction, only now the number of winning bidders is bounded to be
at-least two. The term competitive was then used to indicate an auction that has a constant ratio
on every bid vector against any single price auction that sells at-least two items. A few random
competitive auctions were indeed suggested using this definition over the years, but, as noted
before, no deterministic (asymmetric) auction was ever found. In fact, this was proved not to be a
coincidence when Aggarwal et al. [1] showed that no deterministic auction can be competitive even
on this weaker benchmark.
Given this lower bound a new solution should be considered, and indeed Aggarwal et al. [1]
suggested such. The new definition suggested to generalize the competitive notion to include also
additive losses on top of the multiplicative ones considered before.
We argue that our results indicate that this second approach of considering also the additive
loss is more accurate, as it shows how analyzing with a finer granularity turns an uncompetitive
auction to an optimal one. We elaborate on this agenda in the Discussion section (4).
2 Preliminaries
A bid-vector b ∈ {1, h}n is a vector of n bids. For b ∈ {1, h}n and i ∈ [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} we denote
by b−i the vector which is the result of replacing the ith bid in b with a question mark; that is, b−i
is the vector (b1, b2, . . . , bi−1, ?, bi+1, . . . bn).
Definition 1 (Unlimited supply, unit demand, single item auction). An unlimited supply, unit
demand, single item auction is a mechanism in which there is one item of unlimited supply to sell
by an auctioneer to n bidders. The bidders place bids for the item according to their valuation of
the item. The auctioneer then sets prices for every bidder. If the price for a bidder is lower than
or equal to its bid, then the bidder is considered as a winner and gets to buy the item for its price.
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A bidder with price higher than its bid does not pay nor gets the item. The auctioneer’s revenue is
the sum of the winners prices.
A truthful auction is an auction in which every bidder bids its true valuation for the item.
Truthfulness can be established through bid-independent auctions (see for example [15]). A bid-
independent auction is an auction for which the auctioneer computes the price for bidder i using
only the vector b−i (that is, without the ith bid). Two models have been proposed for describing
random truthful auctions. The first, being the truthful in expectation, refers to auctions for which
a bidder maximizes its expected utility by bidding truthfully. The second model, the universally
truthful is merely a probability distribution over deterministic auctions. Our results uses this second
definition, however, it is known that the two models collide in this setting [14].
Definition 2 (General competitive auction). Let OPT (b) be the best fixed-price (offline) revenue
for an n-bid vector b with bid values 1, h. An auction A is a general competitive auction if its
revenue (expected revenue) from every bid vector b, PA(b) is ≥ α · OPT (b) − o(nh) where α is a
constant not depending on n or h.
3 Bi-valued Auctions
We establish a connection between bi-valued auctions and a specific hat guessing game known as
the majority hat game. This game was studied by Doerr [5] and later by Feige [6]. We use the new
results regarding this game that appeared on [4], which enable us to solve the bi-valued auction
problem optimally.
In a majority hat game there are n players, each wearing a hat colored red or blue. Each player
does not see the color of its own hat but does see the colors of all other hats. Simultaneously, each
player has to guess the color of its own hat, without communicating with the other players. The
players are allowed to meet beforehand, hats-off, in order to coordinate a strategy.
It was shown that the maximum number of correct guesses the players can guaranty is no
more than max {nr, nb} − Ω(
√
n), where nr and nb are the numbers of players with red and blue
hats respectively [5, 6]. It was later proved that there exists an explicit strategy which guaranties
max {nr, nb} −O(
√
n) correct guesses for the players [4].
Consider bi-valued auctions, in which there are n bidders, each can select a value from {1, h}.
The auction’s revenue equals the number of bidders it offers 1 plus h times the number of bidders
it offers h if indeed their value is h. Let nh(b) denotes the number of bidders who bids h in a bid
vector b. Recall that the best offline revenue on vector b is max {n, h · nh(b)}. In this section we
will prove the following.
Theorem 3.1. For bi-valued auctions with n bidders and values from {1, h}
1. There exists a polynomial time deterministic auction that for all bid vector b has revenue
max {n, h · nh(b)} −O(
√
n · h)
2. There is no auction that for all bid vector b has revenue
max {n, h · nh(b)} − o(
√
n · h).
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Note that the lower bound result is unconditional and applies also for randomized superpoly-
nomial auctions. We proceed with a proof for the upper bound in the next section and a proof for
the lower bound in the adjacent one.
3.1 An Auction
We present next a solution to the bi-valued auction problem, namely we show an optimal polynomial
time deterministic auction. We start again by describing a random auction. A derandomization
will be built later using the same methods we presented in the former section for the hat guessing
problem.
3.1.1 A Random Bi-valued Auction
For a fixed input b, let nh be the number of h-bids in b and nh(i) be the number of h-bids in b−i. Let
p′(i) = h·nh(i)−n
h·
√
nh(i)
. If p′(i) ≤ 0 set p(i) = 0 and if p′(i) ≥ 1 set p(i) = 1. Otherwise, (0 < p′(i) < 1),
set p(i) = p′(i). The auction offers value h for bidder i with probability p(i) and 1 otherwise.
Lemma 3.2. The expected revenue of the auction described above is max {n, h · nh} −O(
√
n · h)
Proof. If ∃i, p(i) 6= p′(i) then either h · nh(i) ≤ n so the auction will offer 1 to any 1-bidder and
the revenue will be at-least n = max {n, h · nh}, or h · nh(i) − n ≥ h ·
√
nh(i) so every h-bidder
will be offered h with probability 1 − O(1/√nh) and the expected revenue thus is at-least hnh ·
(1− 1/√nh) = max {n, h · nh} − O(
√
n · h). Either case our auction’s revenue is max {n, h · nh} −
O(
√
n · h). Assume now that ∀i, p(i) = p′(i), note that in this case |n − h · nh| = O(h√nh). The
expected revenue for any bid vector with nh bids of value h is then:
h · nhh · (nh − 1)− n
h · √nh − 1
+ nh · (1− h · (nh − 1)− n
h · √nh − 1
) + (n− nh) · (1− h · nh − n
h · √nh )
≥ h · nhh · (nh − 1)− n
h · √nh − 1
+ nh · (1− h · (nh − 1)− n
h · √nh − 1
) + (n− nh) · (1− h · nh − n
h · √nh − 1
)
≥ h · nhh · (nh − 1)− n
h · √nh − 1
+ n · (1− h · nh − n
h · √nh − 1
) + nh · (1− h · (nh − 1)− n
h · √nh − 1
)− nh · (1− h · (nh − 1)− n
h · √nh − 1
)
= h · nhh · (nh − 1)− n
h · √nh − 1
+ n · (1− h · nh − n
h · √nh − 1
)
= h · nh · h · nh − n
h · √nh − 1
+ n · (1− h · nh − n
h · √nh − 1
)− h · nh√
nh − 1
.
Observe that the sum of the first two terms in the last expression above is max {n, h · nh} −
O(
√
n · h). This is because |n− h ·nh| = O(
√
n · h). The third term however, can be absorbed also
into the O(
√
n · h), which completes the proof of the lemma. 
Hence our auction’s expected revenue is within an additive loss of O(
√
n · h) from the revenue of
the best offline as promised. As noted before, a derandomization for this auction can be built using
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the same ideas appeared in the hat guessing game [4]. This derandomization produces an auction
which has for the worst case only another additive loss of O(
√
n · h) over the expected revenue of
the random auction. Hence, in total, an additive loss of O(
√
n · h) over the best offline revenue is
achieved. We sketch this derandomization here for completeness.
3.1.2 Derandomization
Let a(i) = h · nh(i) − n and b(i) = h ·
√
nh(i). The auction computes the value offered to bidder i
according to the following.
1. Let X(i) =
∑
j j, where the sum ranges over all j 6= i such that the jth bidder bids h.
2. Let Y (i) =
∑
j 1, where the sum ranges over all j < i such that the jth bidder bids h.
3. Let Z(i) = i+X(i) + (b(i) − 1)Y (i) (mod b(i)).
4. Offer h to bidder i if Z(i) < a(i). Otherwise offer 1 to the i’s bidder.
Note that for the random auction whenever p(i) = p′(i) (or as stated here a(i)/b(i) ∈ [0, 1]) we
can define the probability that a 1-bidder will be offered 1, p1,1 = (1− h·nh−nh·√nh ), the probability that
an h-bidder will be offered 1, ph,1 = (1 − h·(nh−1)−nh·√nh−1 ) and the probability that an h-bidder will be
offered h, ph,h =
h·(nh−1)−n
h·√nh−1 .
Lemma 3.3. An auction that follows the above formulation gains revenue of nh · (h · ph,h+ ph,1)−
O(
√
n · h) from all h-bidders. From the 1-bidders, the auction collects (n− nh)p1,1 −O(
√
n · h).
Proof. Let a(1) be the (identical) value a(i) computed by all 1-bidders. In the same manner let
b(1), a(h), b(h) be the (identical) values computed by all bidders. The lemma follows Lemma 3.2
and the following claim:
Claim 3.4.
• For every b(1) consecutive 1-bidders the auction will offer h to a(1) of them and 1 to b(1)−a(1)
• For every b(h) consecutive h-bidders the auction will offer h to a(h) of them and 1 to b(h)−
a(h)
Proof. Consider the h-bidders first. Let 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n be the indices of two consecutive h-bidders.
We have i+X(i) = j +X(j) and Y (j)− Y (i) = 1. Thus Z(j)−Z(i) = b(h)− 1 (mod b(h)). This
implies that out of each b(h) consecutive h-bidders, a(h) will be offered h and b(h) − a(h) will be
offered 1.
Next consider the 1-bidders. Let 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n be the indices of two consecutive 1-bidders. We
have X(i) = X(j) and Y (j)− Y (i) = j − i− 1. Thus Z(j)− Z(i) = j − i+ (b(1)− 1)(j − i− 1) =
b(1)(j − i) − b(1) + 1 ≡ 1 (mod b(1)). This implies that out of each b(1) consecutive 1-bidders,
b(1)− a(1) are offered 1. 
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It is clear that this auction can be implemented in polynomial time as claimed, hence the upper
bound of Theorem 3.1 follows.
Informal Remark: A natural critic that should arise at first glance of our “complicated” sug-
gested auction is its being “unintuitive”. How can one explain/excuse suboptimal actions whenever
nh 6= n/h? Why not deploy DOP in these settings? Note, however, that the proposed auction does
exactly the same. On most inputs it acts as the DOP and only on inputs where nh ≈ n/h it deploys
the “sophisticated” auction. In particular, the auction sacrifices the accuracy of results whenever
for the bid vector b we have that n ≤ hnh(b) ≤ n + h
√
nh(b). This “sophisticated sacrifice”,
however, results in turning an unbounded competitive auction into an optimal one.
Note also that the connection between bi-valued auctions and the majority game is in both
directions. Thus, a solution to the bi-valued auction implies a solution to the majority game and
in particular, an answer to Feige’s open question [6]
3.1.3 A Lower Bound
We prove optimality of the suggested auction in the previous section. For this we prove a lower
bound on the additive loss of any bi-valued auction. The lower bound is unconditional and holds
also for the expected revenue of random auctions. Furthermore, the bound does not depend on the
computation time needed for the auction.
Lemma 3.5. Let A be an auction for the bi-valued {1, h} setting and let PA(b) be A’s revenue on
bid vector b. Then PA(b) equals max {n, h · nh} − Ω(
√
h · n), where b is of size n and nh is the
number of bids of value h in b.
Proof. To prove a lower bound on the difference between the maximum offline revenue, max {n, h · nh},
and any auction we define a distribution D on the possible two-values bid vectors {1, h}n. We then
show that for any deterministic auction, the expected revenue for a random bid vector b (expec-
tation now is with respect to D), is at most P . On the other hand, we show that the expected
revenue of the offline single price (over the distribution D) is at least P + ∆, for some ∆. This
implies (by standard averaging argument, see for example [21]), that for any auction, (including
randomized ones), there must be some vector b for which the auction’s revenue is ∆ less than the
fixed-price offline optimal auction.
The distribution D in our case is quite simple: for every bidder i ∈ [n] independently, set bi = h
with probability 1/h and bi = 1 with probability 1 − 1/h. Now, for every deterministic truthful
auction, knowing D, the price for every element should better be in [h], otherwise there is another
auction that assign prices in [h] and achieves at least the same revenue for every bid vector (the one
that assigns 1 for every value less than 1 and h for every value higher than h). Further, for such
auction, the revenue is the sum of revenues obtained from the n bidders. Thus the expectation
is the sum of expectations of the revenue obtained from the single bidders. Since for bidder i the
expectation is exactly 1 (for any fixed bi the auction must set a constant price α ∈ [h] independent
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of bi. Hence for α > 1, the expected revenue from bidder i is
1
h · h = 1, and for α = 1 the expected
value is clearly 1). We conclude that for every deterministic truthful auction as above, the expected
revenue (with respect to D), is exactly n.
We now want to prove that the expected revenue of the fixed-price offline auction, that knows
b, is n+ Ω(
√
hn). We know, however, the exact revenue of such auction for every bid vector b. It
is just M(b) = max {n, h · nh(b)}, where nh(b) is the number of h-bids in b.
Thus the expected revenue is
ED[M(b)] :=
∑
i<n/h
n ·
(
n
i
)
· (1/h)i · (1− 1/h)n−i +
∑
i>n/h
h · i ·
(
n
i
)
· (1/h)i · (1− 1/h)n−i (1)
+ n ·
(
n
n/h
)
(1/h)n/h(1− 1/h)n−n/h.
To estimate this sum, it is instructive to examine the following deterministic auction which we
note before as DOP . On each vector b, DOP assigns value h for every bidder i for which the
number of h-bids in b−i, is at least n/h (we assume n/h is an integer), and 1 otherwise.
On one side, as argued before, the expected revenue of DOP with respect to D is
E[PDOP ] = n (2)
On the other hand, the same expression, is by definition,
E[PDOP ] =
∑
i<n/h
n ·
(
n
i
)
· (1/h)i · (1− 1/h)n−i +
∑
i>n/h
h · i ·
(
n
i
)
· (1/h)i · (1− 1/h)n−i (3)
+ (n/h) ·
(
n
n/h
)
(1/h)n/h(1− 1/h)n−n/h.
Comparing the expression in Equation (1) and Equation (3), and using Equation (2), we get:
ED[M(b)] = n+ (n− n/h) ·
(
n
n/h
)
(1/h)n/h(1 − 1/h)n−n/h.
Hence we conclude that the difference in expectation between offline revenue ED[M(b)] and the
expected revenue on any deterministic auction, which is n, is,
ED[M(b)]− n = n(1− 1/h) ·
(
n
n/h
)
(1/h)n/h(1− 1/h)n−n/h.
By Stirling’s approximation we know that(
n
n/h
)
= Θ
( √
h/n√
(1− 1/h)(1/h)n/h(1− 1/h)n−n/h
)
.
Therefore, the additive loss is at least Ω(
√
h · n) as claimed. 
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4 Discussion
Bi-valued auctions appeared in several works, such as [2, 9, 18]. We present here a connection
between these auctions and a certain hat guessing game [4–6]. The new optimal solution for
this puzzle results in an optimal deterministic auction for bi-valued auctions. Surprisingly, the
establishment of the tight lower bound for these auctions, involves with analyzing the DOP, the
deterministic optimal auctions for i.i.d. inputs.
Our recent general derandomization [3] suffers from an additive loss of O˜(h
√
n) over the expected
revenue of a random auction. Aggarwal et al. [2] proved that every deterministic auction will suffer
from an additive loss over the best offline auction, hence did not rule out exact derandomizations.
We showed here that every auction (including a random one) suffers from an additive loss of Ω(
√
nh)
over the best offline. Clearly, our understanding of the additive loss is not complete yet and needs
some further investigation.
Further research should ask whether there exists more cases of exact derandomization? Is
there a general exact derandomization? Another interesting future direction, noticing that the
connection between truthful auctions and hat guessing games was not a coincidence, is to reinforce
these connection, maybe with different kind of auctions.
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